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Summary: The failure of credit rating agencies to properly assess risks of
complex financial securities was instrumental in setting off the global financial
crisis. This paper studies the incentives of companies and rating agencies and 
argues that the way the current rating market is organized may provide agen-
cies with intrinsic disincentives to accurately report credit risk of securities they
rate. Informational inefficiency is only enhanced when rating agencies function
as an oligopoly or when they rate structured products. We discuss possible
market and regulatory solutions to these problems.
Key words: Credit rating agencies, Solicited and unsolicited ratings, Moral 
hazard. 






A credit rating is an estimate of the credit quality of a company or a financial securi-
ty. Historically, credit ratings have been most commonly issued in case of public 
debt issued by corporations. In that case, credit rating is based on the credit history of 
the borrower, its assets and liabilities, and its total business activity. The informa-
tional role of credit ratings is crucial for the functioning of modern financial markets. 
On one hand, the borrowers can improve conditions for raising capital and the overall 
perception of the market if they have good credit ratings. On the other hand, inves-
tors can use the ratings to assess the likelihood of repayment, which is crucial for 
pricing of securities. Thus, credit rating agencies provide signals to market partici-
pants on the credit quality of financial securities, both new and already existing in the 
market. As such, they are the first line of defense of investors against unnecessary 
credit risk exposure. This is especially true for those investors for whom it is too 
costly to perform their own credit analysis of available public securities.  
Onset of financial globalization and increased dependence of financial institu-
tions on wholesale funding made credit ratings issued by major Credit Rating Agen-
cies (CRAs) an indispensible part of the investment process. Increasingly, such rat- 
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ings are used for regulatory purposes throughout the financial industry. For example, 
current capital adequacy rules issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion, informally known as Basel II, determine capital requirements based on the rat-
ings assigned by the credit rating agencies (Bank for International Settlements 2006). 
The amount of available capital and the way it is allocated thus critically depends on 
the good quality of credit ratings.  
Given such an important role that CRAs play in the market, it is paramount to 
understand the structure of incentives that determines the behavior of CRAs and their 
interaction with investors, security issuers, and regulators. This is increasingly signif-
icant now after the most reputable CRAs not only failed to forewarn unsuspecting 
investors against risks that subprime mortgage-backed securities had posed, but, also, 
because of their direct involvement in structuring such deals. In particular, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that in helping design AAA tranches of the so-called collatera-
lized debt obligations (CDOs), top rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's, Moo-
dy's and Fitch certified that these securities are of similar risk as, say, U.S. govern-
ment bonds. This, essentially, made these securities look like a very good deal to 
conservative, yet ill advised, institutional investors throughout the world. In a financ-
ing model in which banks and other financial institutions increasingly depend on 
market to obtain necessary funds, global spread of these securities, with the signifi-
cant help of CRAs, had a significant role in global spreading of the financial crisis 
beginning in 2007.  
More recent episodes of failures of the CRAs are related to sovereign debt cri-
sis in Europe, which started in 2010. This was particularly obvious in the case of 
Greece. The credit spread of Greek government bonds increased weeks before the 
agencies downgraded Greek sovereign credit rating. Again, the reasons were sought 
in a combination between the conflict of interest and the objective of rating agencies 
to maintain stability of ratings across markets and business cycles. As suggested by 
Edward I. Altman and Herbert A. Rijken (2004), the CRAs adjust the credit grades 
they assign slowly, since the ratings are constructed to capture default risk over long-
er time horizons. The reason is that most credit rating systems are moving along with 
the business cycle and macroeconomic variables, rather than following daily changes 
in the market variables. However, the cycles are considered as exogenous, and some 
authors, such as Phillip A. O'Hara (2011), pointed that endogenous cycles should be 
taken into account as well when considering any changes in the current credit rating 
methods. As a result, is it commonplace occurrence that credit rating of a security is 
downgraded only after the security sustained a significant loss. 
In this paper, we analyze the mechanisms that could lead to inaccurate report-
ing of credit risk by the CRAs. We focus, primarily, on conflict of interest of CRAs 
and other market participants as well as on the role of both solicited and unsolicited 
ratings. In case of solicited ratings, companies pay a rating agency to be rated upon 
their request, while in case of unsolicited ratings, CRAs rate a security on their own 
volition (and using publicly available information). In a nutshell, solicited ratings 
make firms shop for good credit grades. This leads to a selection bias and credit rat-
ings that are lower on average with respect to unsolicited ratings. Such understate-
ment of credit risk, in turn, increases demand of firms to be rated, and the cycle con- 
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tinues. This profoundly influences the incentives for profit-maximizing rating agen-
cies. In this way the CRAs actually face the tradeoff between increased profit on one 
hand, and increased reputational costs on the other. Such problems are only enhanced 
when CRAs act in an oligopolistic setup. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we present a 
short review of empirical results on predictive ability of credit ratings. In Section 2, 
we analyze the moral hazard problem and discuss some additional issues, such as 
oligopolies and barriers to entry. Section 3 is a discussion of possible solutions to 
these problems, from both market and regulatory perspective. Finally, Section 4 con-
cludes. 
 
1. Predictive Ability of Credit Ratings 
 
A number of empirical papers analyzed the effectiveness of CRAs and predictive 
ability of their ratings. Among the recent studies, one of the first to analyze this issue 
was paper by Frank Partnoy (2002). He studied the apparent paradox in which the 
decreasing informational value of credit ratings is followed by an increasing market 
capitalization of CRAs. He tried to explain this paradox through a dependence of 
Basel II regulatory capital requirements on credit ratings and recommends using of 
market-implied credit spreads instead of CRA-based ones. 
Carmen M. Reinhart (2002) analyzed the ability of sovereign ratings to predict 
crises. Her empirical findings suggest that behavior of sovereign credit ratings have 
practically no predictive power vis-à-vis crises, and this result was robust. It then 
should be no surprise why CRAs failed to anticipate any of the crises – both major 
and minor ones – that happened after the paper was written. Her explanation on why 
this may be the case is related to the fundamentals used by the CRAs, which are 
dominated by financial ratios that are generally poor predictors of distress of sove-
reign debt.  
Albert Metz, Richard Cantor, and Pamela Stumpp (2004) study the predictive 
ability of various indicators used in corporate debt ratings. They find that the antic-
ipative power of corporate ratings varies with time. The results depend on the way 
the test samples on one hand, and the indicators on the other hand, are constructed 
and averaged. 
Marc Piazolo (2006) related the poor predictive ability of credit ratings with 
the conflict of interest of the CRAs. His remarks were motivated by findings of Fre-
deric S. Mishkin (1999), who noticed a similar problem in the banking industry. In 
the framework that Mishkin studied, the moral hazard induces the conflict between 
borrowers and lenders, leading to lending rates that are lower than optimal. Piazolo 
(2006) also pointed the crucial relationship between credit ratings and capital ade-
quacy requirements. 
Some recent papers, such as Leonard I. Nakamura and Kasper Roszbach 
(2010), find that internal ratings assigned by the Swedish banks outperform the ex-
ternal ones assigned by the credit bureau in terms of their predictive power. The pub-
lic ratings, however, do display a satisfactory forecasting ability. The authors con-
clude that credit risk management and bank regulation should be based on methods 
that combine internal and external ratings.  
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2. The Moral Hazard Problem 
 
Recent spectacular failures on part of rating agencies caused a flurry of activity to 
gain better understanding why that happens, and how to prevent similar mistakes to 
be repeated in the future. Much of the answers seem to boil down to the following: 
the very structure of the market of CRAs leads to serious moral hazard problems that 
are not easy to resolve. The purpose of this section is to shed some light on these im-
portant issues. 
First of all, it is important to note that while investors and regulators are users 
of CRAs services, they do not pay for them. Instead, ratings are either unsolicited 
(performed by the rating agency without pay), or solicited, in which case they are 
paid for by the issuer of the security that is supposed to be rated. The fact that often 
times issuer of security pays for its rating does – in fact – create a potentially serious 
and obvious conflict of interest. Namely, a profit-maximizing CRA that issues a soli-
cited credit rating may issue it in such a way as to inflate the rating in order to get a 
repeated business from the issuer. What prevents CRAs from doing this is their fear 
of losing reputation (see, for example, Bo Becker and Todd Milbourn 2010). Richard 
Cantor and Franck Packer (1994) note that, at least up to the point of the writing of 
that article, the fear of losing reputation (i.e. desire to prevent long-term loses) 
seemed to be more important than a desire to make short-term gains by inflating rat-
ings. The focus in that article is on rating of corporate bonds. It was written before 
the famous Enron and Worldcom scandals in 2001-2002, which showed clear lack of 
capacity of the large CRAs to predict sudden deterioration of creditworthiness. This 
is true, in part, by design. Namely, both Standard & Poor's and Moody's aim to have 
consistent ratings that would stay stable across time and space, i.e. across business 
cycles and across different countries. For this reason, their ratings are designed to 
change infrequently and, as such, they are not a particularly good signaling tool if 
changes in company fundamentals are unexpected and sudden. Some spectacular 
failures notwithstanding, however, credit ratings of corporate bonds seemed, at least 
in the eyes of many investors, to have been a useful tool.  
Another important issue related to the structure of the market of CRAs is 
whether or not issuers shop for better ratings. By that we mean that issuer decides on 
which company she wants to be rated by based on the expected rating level they are 
going to get. When there are more than one rating company on the market, as it is the 
case in the U.S. where there were two and now three prominent rating agencies, it is 
possible, at least in principle, that company decides not to be rated by a company that 
would offer her lower rating. Note, however, that traditionally both Standard & 
Poor's and Moody's rate most of the corporate bonds issued by the U.S. public com-
panies. Prior to the appearance of Fitch as a serious market player (in the 1990ies), 
this effectively made implausible that issuers of corporate bonds would be able to 
shop for the rating. Moreover, as regulators frequently require more than one rating, 
both the Standard & Poor's and Moody's ratings were routinely disclosed. Further-
more, in the case of corporate bonds these ratings mostly agreed (see Cantor and 
Packer 1996).  
The situation changed significantly with the appearance of Fitch as a signifi-
cant market player. Contrary to common intuition, introduction of the third player  
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does not necessarily make the situation better. Namely, if a regulator demands that an 
issuer has two ratings, she may indeed select the highest two of the three possible 
ratings. This would deteriorate the quality of corporate bond ratings. There is yet 
another way in which an increased competition may deteriorate the quality of corpo-
rate bond ratings. Namely, it may reduce the expected long-term gains to the rating 
companies, thus reducing their efforts to provide quality rating. Recently, Becker and 
Milbourn (2011) performed a study that tries to determine the impact of increased 
competition in the CRA industry on the quality of corporate bond ratings. In particu-
lar, they find that adding another market player (namely, Fitch) into the existing duo-
poly was accompanied by a reduction of predictive power of corporate bond ratings 
by the CRAs. Moreover, they tested which of the two possible explanations for such 
phenomenon may be more reasonable. They found that, when it comes to corporate 
bond ratings, shopping for ratings might not explain their results. In contrast, their 
results seem to be consistent with the second explanation, namely that an increased 
competition reduces motivation of CRAs as it reduces their long-term rents.  
In contrast to corporate bond rating, Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) are signif-
icantly more prone to shopping for rating. There are many ways in which ratings of 
ABSs differ from those of corporate bonds. First of all, the nature of risk is very dif-
ferent (see Adam B. Ashcraft and Til Schuermann 2008). While the primary risk fac-
ing a corporate bond investor is a company-specific risk, ABS is a portfolio of assets. 
Thus, the key risk is systematic risk affecting the entire portfolio. Second, issuers 
manipulate the pool structure through various credit-enhancing techniques. In addi-
tion, different tranches have very different risk profiles. Third, it is significantly more 
difficult to predict default, prepayment and their interaction in case of ABS, than it is 
to do so in case of corporate bonds. Fourth, at the time of security issuance, the issuer 
collaborates with a particular rating agency to structure the deal (agencies received 
hefty consulting fees for this additional service). Fifth, models used for pricing and 
risk assessment of these securities are quite complex and prone to mistakes. Due to 
all of this, most ABS deals have been rated by a single rating agency. In such cir-
cumstances, it is much easier to shop around for the most favorable rating, especially 
since such deals are opaque to most investors, except, perhaps, for the most sophisti-
cated ones. 
Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas, and Joel Shapiro (2009) develop a theoretical 
model that studies the rating game that aims to understand the interaction between 
CRAs, issuers and investors. In their model, CRAs charge an upfront fee as well as a 
fee when rating is issued. There is a tradeoff between short-term gains by CRAs 
through, say, rating inflation, on one hand, and long-term loses related to a dimi-
nished market reputation. While the model can be applied, in principle, to all situa-
tions in which credit ratings are issued, it is particularly well suited to understand 
problems related to rating of ABSs. In the model, naïve investors coexist with so-
phisticated ones, i.e. the ones that are able to understand how rating game is played. 
They find that CRAs are more likely to inflate ratings in situations when there is a 
larger fraction of naïve investors on the market. This can happen, in particular, when 
securities that are being rated are highly complex, such as MBSs and other structured 
products. The fraction of naïve investors is high, also, when investors do not invest  
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their own money and do not bear the brunt of negative consequences if they sustain 
losses. Most of the institutional investors, even the sophisticated ones, can behave as 
if they are naïve in that sense. Furthermore, the fraction of naïve investors is higher 
in times of prosperity and smaller in times of recession, when money is harder to 
come buy. The authors show that, in equilibrium, when a fraction of unsophisticated 
investors is sufficiently high, CRAs short-term gains can be higher than losses re-
lated to diminished reputation. In that situation, they would rationally inflate ratings 
during booms. In recessions, on the other hand, they would be more likely to report 
truthfully on the creditworthiness of an issuer.  
Another important insight of the Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) paper is 
that duopoly may not be better either from the total social welfare or from the inves-
tors’ welfare point of view. Namely, starting from a monopoly setting and adding 
another CRA into the market makes issuers to shop around for the best rating. The 
social welfare is further reduced when tranching is allowed. To at least partially re-
solve the moral hazard problem they propose that there should be mandatory disclo-
sure of all ratings. 
It is important to note, however, that mandatory disclosure of ratings can in it-
self lead to another kind of problem. Namely, let us consider the case of unsolicited 
ratings. As we have mentioned before, Standard & Poor's and Moody's routinely 
provide ratings of corporate bonds issued by U.S. companies, whether companies 
solicit these ratings or not. In principle, there is no reason to believe that these ratings 
should be the same or that they should provide equally accurate analyses of credit-
worthiness of companies as solicited ratings. Namely, bulk of the information that 
CRAs uses for unsolicited ratings are publicly available. This is because issuers do 
not necessarily disclose private information to a rating agency unless they decide to 
solicit ratings. Having said that, there seems to be no evidence of serious discrepancy 
between unsolicited and solicited ratings when American CRAs rate American com-
panies, as the results of Christina E. Bannier, Patrick Behr, and André Güttler (2007) 
imply. On the other hand, the authors show that the same is not the case when U.S. 
rating companies provide unsolicited ratings of foreign companies.
1 Namely, they 
find that in most cases unsolicited ratings of foreign companies have been lower than 
their subsequent solicited rating. Moreover, unsolicited ratings seemed to have been 
too low, i.e. they very frequently overestimated actual probability of default of rated 
companies, while the same have not been true in case of solicited ratings of foreign 
companies.  
One possible explanation that the authors provide is that companies self-select. 
Those companies that are indeed of lower risk than the unsolicited rating would seem 
to suggest try to correct the market perception by soliciting their rating. For such 
companies, a more in-depth analysis would then prove that they are, indeed, of lower 
risk than the initial rating suggested. Thus, solicited ratings end up being higher than 
unsolicited ones. There is, however, another and more sinister possible explanation 
of the same phenomenon. Namely, the authors argue that the outcome could be ob-
tained if rating companies deliberately target some foreign companies for a "black-
                                                        
1 In contrast to American companies, American CRAs do not automatically rate foreign companies.   
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mail". They issue lower unsolicited ratings on purpose in order to make companies 
more prone to ask for a solicited rating, in order to correct tarnished market percep-
tion of their creditworthiness. Interestingly, the empirical evidence seems to reject 
the first explanation in favor of the second. Thus, this seems to be yet another exam-
ple of how CRAs game the system. 
 
3. Possible Solutions 
 
In this section we discuss various proposed solutions for regulation of the credit rat-
ing industry.  
Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay (2004) considers an optimal contract between four 
players: CRA, investors, issuers, and regulators (the government). In contrast to the 
U.S. model that is based on issuer paying for the rating, in this model the government 
pays for the rating through collecting taxes from market participants. The author 
shows that the moral hazard problem can be eliminated by an appropriate contract 
design. Namely, it would be optimal to provide an incentive compensation for the 
CRA by linking it to performance of the rated debt (i.e. through an ex-post compen-
sation).   
Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) study possible regulatory changes that 
would minimize the conflict of interest. In order to reduce the likelihood of shopping 
for the rating by an issuer, they propose a revision to the so-called Cuomo Plan.
2 In 
addition to the original proposal, in which an upfront fee is charged (i.e. the payment 
to a CRA is made before the rating is issued), the authors suggest an addition of 
mandatory disclosure of any rating produced by CRAs. On the other hand, they argue 
that this may not solve all of the problems since it may reduce profits of rating com-
panies and make them less interested in providing good quality ratings.  
The capital requirements of banks and other regulated financial institutions are 
also significantly affected by any wrong assessment of credit risk. The Basel II 
framework suggests that solicited ratings should be used for calculation of risk-
weighted assets (Bank for International Settlements 2006).
3 Although the national 
regulators have discretion to allow the use of unsolicited ratings in the assessment of 
risk-weighted assets (RWA), most decide not to. The reason is that only solicited 
ratings are based on a due diligence process, while unsolicited use only publicly 
available information, leaving any company-specific details out of the final rating. 
However, as Bannier, Behr, and Güttler (2007) show, the unsolicited ratings are 
usually lower than the solicited ones. Hence, if regulatory capital requirements were 
based on unsolicited ratings, they will be higher on average, thus partly compensat-
ing for the lack of transparency. 
Another potential problem when RWA calculations are based on unsolicited 
ratings is that this scheme may reduce the number of companies that are rated and 
promote regulatory arbitrage towards financially distressed borrowers that "look 
good on paper". One alternative would be to set up a government-sponsored agency 
                                                        
2 The original Cuomo Plan is a result of an agreement between Andrew Cuomo, Attorney General of the 
New York State, and the three main credit rating agencies. 
3 See §108, Bank for International Settlements (2006).  
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with an exclusive right to provide ratings. These ratings would have to be used by 
financial institutions in their credit risk assessment and determination of capital 
charges. In fact, as Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) show, a monopolistic CRA is 
certainly more efficient than a duopoly setup. Another alternative, proposed by Part-
noy (2002), would be to use credit spreads on marketable instruments, such as sove-
reign and corporate bonds, to determine the RWA. 
Along the lines of introducing a government-backed agency in the rating game 
are the recent criticisms by EU government officials. After abrupt downgrades of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain by the major CRAs in 2010, some officials called for an 
"independent" European rating agency (Financial Times Europe 2010). In this way, 
they believe, moral hazard problems faced by the major CRAs may be avoided. In 
addition, an EU-based rating agency may act as a balance from negative influences 




To conclude, in this paper we have discussed numerous important conflicts of inter-
est inherent in the CRA industry. It is quite clear that, in order to protect public inter-
est, there is a scope for market and regulatory solutions that can be applied indivi-
dually or in combination. Given the complexity of issues at hand, and ambiguity of 
theoretical and empirical insights, one needs to thread carefully, however. It is a deli-
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